Macondo Well-Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Offshore Drilling Safety
Committee for Analysis of Causes of the Deepwater Horizon Explosion, Fire, and Oil Spill to Identify Measures to Prevent Similar Accidents to the Future; National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council
NAAS Press | 2011 | ISBN: 0309221382 9780309221382 | 134 pages | PDF | 9 MB

This book will be of interest to professionals in the oil and gas industry, government decision makers, environmental advocacy groups, and others who seek an understanding of the processes involved in order to ensure safety in undertakings of this nature. This report examines the causes of the blowout and provides a series of recommendations, for both the oil and gas industry and government regulators, intended to reduce the likelihood and impact of any future losses of well control during offshore drilling.

This issue discusses ultimate responsibility and accountability for well integrity and safety of offshore equipment, formal system safety education and training of personnel engaged in offshore drilling, and guidelines that should be established so that well designs incorporate protection against the various credible risks associated with the drilling and abandonment process.

Contents
Summary.
1 Introduction
Challenges in Designing and Constructing Offshore Wells
Several Past Accidents Caused by Blowouts
History of Macondo Well Before the Blowout
Committee's Approach to Its Task.
Other Investigations
2 Well Design and Construction.
Overview of the Macondo Well Plan
Findings
Observations
Recommendations
3 Blowout Preventer System.
BOP System for Deepwater Horizon
Areas of Investigation
Findings.
Observations
Recommendations
4 Mobile Offshore Drilling Units
The Deepwater Horizon Rig
Findings.
Observations
Recommendations
5 Industry Management of Offshore Drilling
Safety Culture
Recommendations
6 Regulatory Reform
Regulation of U.S. Offshore Drilling Prior to the Macondo Well Blowout
DOI's Safety and Environmental Management System Program
Goal-Oriented Risk Management Regulatory Systems
Recommendations
7 Concluding Comments
References
APPENDICES
A Statement of Task
B Public Agendas of the Committee on the Analysis of Causes of the Deepwater Horizon Explosion, Fire, and Oil Spill to Identify Measures to Prevent Similar Accidents in the Future
C Calculating the Differential Pressure at the Start of the Negative Test and the Quality of Foam Cement
D Study Committee Biographical Information